Military Rules of Evidence: Adoption or Abrogation of the Common Law? by Mills, Richard H.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
Military Rules of Evidence: Adoption or
Abrogation of the Common Law?
Richard H. Mills
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Common Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mills, Richard H. (1989) "Military Rules of Evidence: Adoption or Abrogation of the Common Law?," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 22 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol22/iss3/4
MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE:
ADOPTION OR ABROGATION OF THE COMMON LAW?
by
HONORABLE RICHARD H. MILLS*
It is told that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Augustus
Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals often walked together on their way
to their respective courts in the nation's capital.
On one particularly delightful spring day, as they approached the
Washington intersection where each would make their separate way,
Judge Hand said: "Good day' And do justice, Your Honor."
"Oh," replied Justice Holmes, "It's not my duty to do justice--
just to see that the rules are complied with."'
Posit: What role should the common law of evidence play in a military judge's
decisions under the present rules of evidence?
My conclusion is that the answer to this question is of bedrock importance to
military justice.
The Annual Reports of the Code Committee on Military Justice--for the last
several fiscal years--make it graphically clear that the interpretation and application
of the Military Rules of Evidence accounted for a large share of the work of the
Courts of Military Review.2 Those reports use the phrases "numerous cases," "a
large portion of the docket" and "a significant portion of the Court's calendar."
3
*United States District Judge for the Central District of Illinois. Prior to his appointment, Judge Mills was
State's Attorney for four years, an Illinois Circuit Judge for 10 years, and a Justice of the Appellate Court
of Illinois for nearly 9 years. He holds a B.A. from Illinois College, a J.D. from Mercer University (Editorial
Board, Mercer Law Review), and an LL.M. from the University of Virginia.
Just after taking the federal bench, Judge Mills retired as Colonel, JAGC, U.S. Army Reserve, after
over 30 years service, and was appointed a Brigadier General in the Illinois Militia. During the Korean War,
General Mills served 14 months in Korea with the 3rd Infantry Division and received the Bronze Star. He
is a graduate of the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School, the Command and General Staff College
and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
(The material for this article was originally presented as the keynote address to the 14th Interservice
Military Judges' Seminar at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, sponsored by the U.S. Air Force. The author is
indebted to his Law Clerk, Donald Shawler, for the excellent research and stimulation leading to both the
content and exposition of this subject.)
'A Washington, D.C. legal folklore.2Annual Report of the Code Committee on Military Justice (Oct. 1, 1985 - Sept. 30, 1986), (Oct. I, 1984 -
Sept. 30, 1985); (Oct. I, 1983 - Sept. 30, 1984).
3Id.
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Definition
"Evidence" may be defined as information which is offered for the purpose
of establishing the required degree of persuasion, either positive or negative, in the
minds of the court members (the jury) or the law officer (the judge) concerning the
truth of any matter of fact which must be determined during trial. The law of
evidence consists of those rules under which it is determined that information may
or may not be presented for consideration by the court members or law officer, and
what weight is to be given the information that may be presented.4
THE MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE - AN INTRODUCTION
While still providing the certainty necessary for a worldwide criminal prac-
tice, the Military Rules of Evidence largely correspond to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The minor modifications contained in the military rules incorporate
specialized military practices and terms--for example, "court members" and
"military judge" instead of "jury" and "court." 5 The sections of the Military
Rules, I--General Provisions, II--Judicial Notice, IV--Relevancy and its Limits, VI--
Witnesses, VII--Opinions and Expert Testimony, VIII--Hearsay, IX--Authentica-
tion and Identification, X--Contents of Writings, Records, and Photographs, and,
XI--Miscellaneous Rules follow the federal pattern, except sections III and V which
differ significantly.
Section III of the military rules represents a partial codification of the law
relating to self-incrimination, confessions and admissions, search and seizure, and
eyewitness identification. Its drafters believed this material should be codified
because of the large number of lay personnel holding important roles within the
military legal system and the relative inaccessibility of attorneys and law libraries to
non-lawyer legal officers. These rules represent a judgment that it would be
impractical to operate without them. 6The same section of the federal rules, on the
other hand, pertains to presumptions in civil actions. Because no presumption may
be given a binding effect in criminal proceedings, there was no need to place a like
section in the military rules as they apply only to courts-martial.7
In contrast, section V of both sets of rules addresses privileges, but the
military's version promulgates specific guidelines, while its federal counterpart
leaves the issue of a privilege's applicability to the common law alone. Congress did
4 J. MUNSTER & M. LARKIN, MILITARY EVIDENCE 1-2 (1959).
' MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, A22-l (1984) (hereinafter Manual).61d. at A22-5.
'MIL. R. EvID. 101(a); Blackmar, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence--How Will They Affect the Trial
of Cases? 27 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 17, 40 (1970).
[Vol. 22:3
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MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE
not accept the Supreme Court's proposed privilege rules because the lawmakers
could not achieve a consensus as to the desirability of a number of specific
privileges.' The military rules deem the federal approach impractical within the
armed forces due again to the need for stability in view of the system's dependence
upon laymen and temporary courts, as well as its inherent geographical and person-
nel changes. 9
Yet despite these differences, an understanding of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the common law precedents from which they evolved is imperative if
the majority of the military rules is to be properly employed. Military Rule 101(b)
recognizes as much:
Secondary sources. If not otherwise prescribed in this Manual [for
Courts-Martial] or these rules, and insofar as practicable and not incon-
sistent with or contrary to the [Uniform] Code [of Military Justice] or
this Manual, courts-martial shall apply:
(1) First, the Rules of Evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts;
and
(2) Second, when not inconsistent with subdivision (b)(l),
the Rules of Evidence at common law.
In 1983, the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Clemons' ° construed this
provision to mean that where article III federal court precedent is not inconsistent
with military practice, the trial judge should consider such authority. The drafters'
analysis to the military rules similarly recognizes that although not binding,
"specific decisions of the Article III courts involving rules which are common both
to the Military Rules and the Federal Rules should be considered very persuasive....
[A] significant policy consideration in adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence was
to insure, where possible, common evidentiary law.""
Of course, Rule 101 (a) makes clear that the Military Rules of Evidence are the
primary, binding source of evidentiary law for military courts. Perhaps a literal
reading of the rule would indicate what the 1985 concurring opinion argues in the
Navy/Marine Court of Military Review case of United States v. McConnell: "It is
only where the military rules do not dispose of an issue [that] the Article III federal
practice, when practicable and not inconsistent or contrary to the Military Rules,
'S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 200-01 (2d ed. 1977).
9 Manual, supra note 5, at A22-35.
1o 16 M.J. 44 (C.M.A. 1983).
' Manual, supra note 5, at A22-2.
Winter, 19891
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shall be applied."' 2 However any approach which arguably attempts to restrict the
use of federal precedent to a situation where no military rule is on point unduly limits
the authority on which the military judge can rely in reaching a decision--especially
when few military courts may have had the opportunity to pass on the issue at bar.
Admittedly, when a military court looks to the federal rules and their
construction as a source of guidance, it must be careful to distinguish the provisions
which the military rules have explicitly or implicitly rejected from those they have
not. The admonishment for caution, however, does not alter the path which the
United States Court of Military Appeals set out in United States v. Nivens even before
the enactment of Rule 101: "This court has repeatedly held that federal practice
applies to courts-martial if not incompatible with military law or with the special re-
quirements of the military establishment."' 3
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
"In law as in life, lines have to be drawn."
--Justice Frankfurter 4
In March 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved the
proposal of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure that an
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence be established by appointment from
the Chief Justice of the United States.' 5 The Chief Justice, however, first designated
a special committee to study and report on the advisability and feasibility of adopting
uniform rules of evidence in the federal courts, and thus postponed naming a
committee to undertake the task of actually drafting the rules. 16 This special
committee submitted its report to the Standing Committee in December 1961.7
At that time, the law pertaining to evidence in criminal trials was prescribed
in Federal Criminal Rule 26:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges
of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these
rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
1220 M.J. 577 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985), affd, 24 M. 127 (C.M.A. 1987).
'3United States v. Nivens, 21 C.M.A. 420,423,45 C.M.R. 194, 197 (1972). See generally S. SALTZBURG, L.
SCHINASI & D. SCHLUETER, MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 7-8 (2d ed. 1986).
'4 Pearce v. Commissioners of Internal Revenue, 315 U.S. 543, 558 (1942).
'5See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates,
46 F.R.D. 161, 175-76 (1969) (hereinafter Preliminary Draft).
I'Id. at 176.
'
7See Rules of Evidence: A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73 (1962).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3
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reason and experience.
The rule applicable to civil proceedings, however, Federal Civil Rule 43(a),
followed a different theory:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore
applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity,
or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdic-
tion of the state in which the United States court is held. In any case, the
statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and
the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient
method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is
herein made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined
in a like manner.
Because of the double burden placed on courts and practitioners by these divergent
standards, and the desire to organize and simplify the developed principles, prece-
dents and procedures, the report found a need for improvement in federal evidence
law.'"
After receiving comments from the legal profession, the Chief Justice pro-
ceeded to select an advisory committee to promulgate the proposed rules. This task
was completed in early 1965. The committee consisted of fifteen members, of whom
eight were litigation attorneys, four were federal judges, two were professors, and
one was a member of the Department of Justice." The committee's distinguished
reporter was Law Professor Edward Cleary, a recognized authority on the law of
evidence, later the founding Dean of the Arizona State University School of Law.20
The Judicial Conference sent the committee's preliminary draft of the pro-
posed rules to the Supreme Court for comment in 1969. The report was later returned
to committee and in 1971 a revised version was circulated. 21 In 1972, the Supreme
Court prescribed Federal Rules of Evidence effective July 1, 1973, unless Congress
disapproved within 90 days. Justice Douglas, however, dissented, saying: "There
are those who think that fashioning of rules of evidence is a task for the legislature,
not for the judiciary. Wigmore thought the task was essentially a judicial one, and
I share that view, leaving the problem for case-to-case development by the courts or
'Id. at 115-16.
"Preliminary Drafl, supra note 15, at 178.
2
0 Id.
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by Congress.' 2
At this point, the smooth passage of the Rules became involved in Watergate,
complete with its controversy surrounding the executive privilege. Because Con-
gress had other matters to which it was required to attend, it promptly adopted Public
Law 93-12 deferring the rules' effective date until legislative approval. Over a year
later, in his message to Congress on November 14, 1974, President Gerald Ford said:
Earlier this session, the House passed a bill to codify for the first time
in our history, evidentiary rules governing the admissibility of proof in
Federal courts. This bill is the culmination of some 13 years of study by
distinguished judges, lawyers, Members of the Congress and others
interested in and affected by the administration of justice in the Federal
system. The measure will lend uniformity, accessibility, intelligibility
and a basis for reform and growth in our evidentiary rules which are
sadly lacking in current law. I strongly urge final action on this
important bill prior to the conclusion of this Congress. 23
Following extensive study and much legislative debate by both houses, a conference
committee reached agreement and the bill was adopted during the week of December
16, 1974. The President signed the law on January 2, 1975, effective July 1, 1975.24
MILTARY RULES OF EVIDENCE
The power source for the promulgation of military rules is found in article I,
section 8 of the United States Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power ... To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces....' '25
Accordingly, Congress enacted in 1950, and revised in 1956, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. 26 Although the Code contains some provisions relating to eviden-
tiary law, particularly section 831 dealing with the right against self-incrimination,
and section 849, addressing depositions, its most important provision is undoubtedly
article 36--or section 836--which states:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of
proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, mili-
tary commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts
of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which
22 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).23See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE X (1986).
21 Id. at viii-x.
25 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
2, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1985).
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shall so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or
inconsistent with this chapter. 27
The President's regulations prescribed under this article are located in the Manual
for Courts-Martial given effect by Executive Order No. 10214 dated February 8,
1951.28
Chapter XXVII of the 1951 manual was entirely devoted to various rules of
evidence applicable in cases before courts-martial. Its coverage, however, was
limited to a statement of broad rules with little interpretation. 29 To correct this
shortcoming, the manual further provided at paragraph 137 of the chapter: "So far
as not otherwise prescribed in this manual, the rules of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts or, when not
inconsistent with such rules, at common law will be applied by courts-martial." 3 °'
Thus, in the absence of a specific governing provision in the manual, the former
Federal Criminal Rule 26, previously quoted, regulated the admissibility of evidence
in military trials prior to 1975.
However, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a change in this
approach was inevitable. In view of the language of article 36 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice3 and chapter XXVII, paragraph 137 of the Manual for Courts-
Martial providing for the application of federal criminal evidentiary law in military
courts, it was only a matter of time until the President specifically directed that the
federal rules, albeit with modification, be used in courts-martial .32
The Military Rules of Evidence, published in 1980 as chapter XXVII of the
manual by virtue of Executive Order No. 12198, resulted from a two year effort of
the Department of Defense, the United States Court of Military Appeals, the Military
Departments and the Department of Transportation. 3 The Evidence Working
Group of the Joint-Service Committee on Military Justice initially drafted the rules.34
They were then reviewed, and, as modified, approved by the Joint-Service Commit-
tee.35 In 1984, the Manual for Courts-Martial was revised and the rules now appear
in part III.
271 Id. at § 836.
21 J. MUNSTER & M. LARKIN, supra note 4, at 5.
2-9 1d. at vii.
3Id. at viii.
31 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1985).
32See S. SALTZBURG, L. SCtIINASI & D. SCHLUETER, supra note 13, at vii.
33 Manual, supra note 5, at A22- 1.
3 Id.
3. Manual, supra note 5, at A22- I.
Winter, 1989]
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APPLICATION OF THE RULES
Being a trial judge is like playing bridge. It's a game of
decisions. You make 'em right, and you make 'em wrong, but you
make 'em NOW!36
To insure that those individuals charged with deciding the facts of a particular
case were presented with the most reliable, trustworthy and accurate information
available, courts long ago began to develop rules of evidence. As these rules evolved
to meet new situations, they became part of the common law of evidence. This
process has literally consumed hundreds of years and continues today.37
In principal, no common law of evidence remains under the federal and
military rules. Rule 402 of both the Federal and Military Rules provides that "All
relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided .... ,,31 However
realistically, "the common law remains as a source of guidance in identifying prob-
lems and suggesting solutions, within the confines of the rules." 3' No other
reasonable conclusion may be reached when one considers the vast collection of
common law precedents that constituted the earth from which the rules grew. While
the "rules are in final analysis legislative in nature ... [t]he basic relevant interpretive
materials are the common law background and the legislative history" which
continually refers to it. 411
One example of this approach to interpreting the rules is found in the 1980
Third Circuit case of Carter v. Hewitt" where the Court expressly relied on the
common law to construe Rule 404 dealing with the admissibility of character
evidence.42 The Court said: "These ... cases, cited by Carter in support of his
position, were decided before the Federal Rules of Evidence were issued. Rule 404,
however, is in essence a codification of the common law approach, and these pre-rule
cases may be regarded as authority for interpreting the rule." 43 Yet another of the
numerous instances in which courts have utilized pre-rule case law to interpret the
rules may be located in Cann I'. Ford Motor Co. 44 In Cann, the Second Circuit held
that although Rule 407, prohibiting the use of subsequent remedial measures to infer
3" Author's original quote.
"7 BASIC MILITARY JUSTIcE. HANDBOOK, I -I (rev. ed. 1986).
31 FED. R. EvID., 402; Mi1. R. Evid.. 402.
39 Federal Rules of Evidence of United States Courts and Magistrates v. (1984) (introduction by Professor
Cleary).
'"Id. at iii-iv. See e.g., Fi o. R. Evij. 403 (advisory committee's note) (rule of legal relevancy does not
enumerate surprise as ground for exclusion, in this respect following Wigmore's view of the common law);
FED. R. EvID. 612 (advisory committee's note) (treatment of writings used to refresh recollection while on
the stand is in accord with settled doctrine).
"617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980).
' Id. at 968 § n. 6.
4617 F.2d 961,968 n.6 (3d Cir. 1980).
" 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
[Vol. 22:3
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negligence or culpable conduct, did not explicitly refer to strict liability actions, it
nevertheless applied to such claims.45 Here is the way the Court put it:
When Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, it left many gaps
and omissions in the rules in the expectation that common law principles
would be applied to fill them. The application of those principles con-
vinces us that although negligence and strict products liability causes of
actions are distinguishable, no distinction between the two justifies the
admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict prod-
ucts liability actions.4"
The drafters realized that what took Wigmore ten volumes to say could not
reasonably be condensed into a set number of rules without--as Professor Cleary
phrased it--'" some play in the joints."47 Thus, Rule 102 was included in the federal
rules, and later incorporated without change into the military rules. Heady wine.
"These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustified expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined." 4" Rule 102 recognizes that a codified law of evidence cannot possibly
address every situation that might arise. In this regard, it negates the precept that
statutes in derogation of the common law are subject to a strict construction.49 The
rule instead permits courts to mold evidentiary law to insure its growth and
refinement so that the fact-finder might reach a proper result. As Law Professor
Weissenberger of the University of Cincinnati states:
A system of rules that does not allow for some discretion on the part of
a trial judge in making evidentiary rulings lays the ground work for its
own obsolescence. As methods of communication and interaction
between individuals change, the Rules of Evidence must accommodate
this progress. Rule 102 is designed to insure the continued viability of
the Federal Rules of Evidence by providing that the evidence as to the
disputed relationship between the parties is available to the trier of
fact.50
But a word of caution. Judges must remember that Rule 102 serves only to
guide them in their construction of other rules. It certainly is not a license to override
the dictates of other rules so that a desired result can be obtained. 5' Being unduly
innovative and crafting out new theories of evidence is like breeding porcupines.
41 Id. at 59-60.
46 Id. at 60.




1 M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 3-4 (1981).
,G. WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 5-6 (1987).
5' Manual, supra note 5, at A22-2; S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi & D. Schlueter, supra note 9, at 12-13.
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You proceed very carefully. Because the reviewing court may indeed remind you
of the fortunes of war-- if you seek the battle, don't complain of the wounds. At best,
Rule 102 may be deemed to authorize "the court to interpret the Rules creatively so
as to promote the growth and development in the law of evidence in the interest of
justice and reliable factfinding." 5 2
The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Bibbs53 provides an example
of the proper use for Rule 102. In that case, the issue involved whether Rule 613's
provisions for using prior inconsistent statements should affect the admissibility of
subsequent inconsistent statements. 54 The Court found that because the rule did not
address the matter, the trial judge could properly fashion an evidentiary approach
under the guidance of Rule 102. 51 Another case where the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals invoked the spirit of Rule 102, although not specifically citing it, is United
States v. Burkley. 56 There, the Court held that evidence of other crimes was
admissible to show the existence of a common scheme or plan, or to prove
predisposition even though Rule 404(b) did not specifically permit such use. 57
Consistent with the rationale underlying Rule 102 to guarantee that all relevant
facts are brought to the attention of the factfinders, the jury or court members,
'congressional enactments in the field of evidence have generally tended to expand
admissibility beyond the scope of the common law rules.' '58 While the present rules
codify much of what had been previously established and, as noted, should be
interpreted accordingly, in some instances they permit the admission of evidence
that may have been excluded under prior practice. 9
Consider the following illustrations: Under Rule 60 1, everyone is considered
competent to testify except where privilege applies or where the individual is
unwilling or unable to take an oath to be truthful. Eliminated from the law are the
categorical disabilities, such as extreme youth, which previously existed. 6' Another:
Rule 703 broadens considerably the permissible basis for expert opinions and
"brings the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves
when not in court." 6 Thus, under Rule 703, an expert can discuss as the basis for
an opinion, facts or data, which are otherwise inadmissible hearsay, if of a type
reasonably relied on by experts in the field.62
12 United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (per Weinstein J. & member of the
advisory committee on the rules).
51564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978).54 Id. at 1169.
55Id.
5659 1 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979).
571 Id. at 920-21.
58Fed. R. Evid., 402 (advisory committee's note).
59 S. SALTZBURG, L. SCHINASI & D. SCIILUETER, supra note 13, at xii.
'See United States v. Lemere, 16 M.J. 682, 685-86 (A.C.M.R. 1983), affd, 22 M.J. 61 (C.M.A. 1986).
61 FED. R. EvID., 703 (advisory committee's note).
6 2Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1983).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3
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Or this example: The common law required that before impeaching his own
witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement a party show that the testimony
surprised him as well as substantially harmed his case. In view of Federal Rule 607
which provides that either party may impeach any witness, surprise is no longer a
viable requirement.63 Other examples do exist but they are far too numerous to
efficiently lend themselves to an exhaustive list. Suffice it to say that the overwhelm-
ing majority of modifications to the common law is consonant with the "Rules' spirit
of broadening admissibility." 64
CONCLUSION
Like Mark Twain's comment on Wagner's music: "It's better than
it sounds."
Perhaps Chief Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York--who
incidentally served on the advisory committee for the rules--best summarizes the
appropriate outlook for a trial judge when confronted with evidentiary questions:
A trial judge's approach to the Rules of Evidence is often of greater
practical importance than the technical rules themselves in their admini-
stration. It is my view that it is generally better for the trier--whether
judge or jury--to have available as much of the non-repetitive evidence
as possible. The conviction that the Federal Rules are better interpreted
and applied--whenever it is reasonable to do so--so as to permit the trial
judge to admit rather than to exclude evidence is reflected throughout
[the rules].65
A trial judge's disposition to admit rather than exclude becomes stronger with
experience. Mostjurors, or military court members, have good sense and dedication
to their calling. These mature individuals, many of whom have college educations,
are perceptive and knowledgeable. The Court should treat them with respect. Judge
Weinstein noted that:
Excluding information on the ground that jurors are too ignorant or
emotional to evaluate it properly may have been appropriate in England
at a time when a rigid class society created a wide gap between royal
judges and commoner jurors, but it is inconsistent with the realities of
our modem American informed society and the responsibilities of inde-
pendent thought in a working democracy.66
United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 1977).
United States v. Groves, 19 M.J. 804, 807 (A.C.M.R. 1985), rev'd, 23 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1987).
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Extensive pretrial discovery likewise supports the argument for liberal admis-
sibility. Today, attorneys should always be aware of the opponent's evidence before
trial. If they object, the Court can insist on motions in limine. With the element of
surprise no longer a viable objection, all parties are then able to present their cases
in a manner by which the trier of fact can properly evaluate probative force without
the fear of being misled.
The key ingredients to reaching the proper decision in any instance are
flexibility and discretion. No two lawsuits are exactly alike. A judge needs to keep
a tight check on some counsel; others warrant little interference from the court. Court
members at times may require shielding from argument suggesting inadmissible
lines of proof, while others can sort the good from the bad themselves. "[L]itigation
psychodynamics, but dimly if at all perceived from the record, are nevertheless
critical in trial supervision. In dealing with them, the oral tradition of the bar and a
sense of what is proper, often furnish the best guide. In this sense, the rules provide
only the skeleton of the trial." 6 7
Unlimited discretion may unquestionably lead to bad habits and abuse, while
increasing the difficulty of preparing for trial. A lawyer should be able to read the
rules with some certainty of outcome in mind. However there is nothing requiring
the court to "adhere blindly to a rule of evidence, which is by its nature arbitrary,
when there is danger that the very purposes of the Rules of Evidence would be
abrogated." 68
As a final example, Military Rule 403 provides that "[allthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the members .... ,69
It is, of course, in this atmosphere that all evidence must ultimately be
analyzed.
A final caveat: We must constantly bear in mind that there is no such
commodity in this life as perfection. As the late theologian, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr,
once wrote: "The tragedy of man is that he can conceive perfection but he cannot
achieve it. Man's reach is always beyond his grasp."7°
The perfect trial has yet to be tried. And I venture to suggest that it never will
be. For any creation of man is merely a reflection of himself--imperfection. All we
can reasonably and logically strive for is a fair trial--the "cutting edge" to our
67 Id.
11 United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 290 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
6
,MIL. R. EVID. 403.
7 People v. Parisie, 5 111. App. 3d 1009, 287 N.E.2d 310 (1972).
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system of criminal justice.7
And the Military Rules of Evidence is a new and powerful tool in our constant
quest to hone that edge for yet better justice.
11 Id. at 1016.
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